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Rent-Seeking for a Risky Rent: A Model and Experimental Investigation

1. Introduction
Rent seeking (the spending and transferring of resources to privately capture
value) is a prevalent problem in many settings. Typically, this problem has been
described in the context of lobbying in order to obtain a monopoly rent (Tullock 1967).
However, the inefficient quest for personal privilege which rent-seeking models describe
can be observed in multiple settings and organizations, from pesticide legislation (Wise
and Sandler 1994) to value formation in the art markets (Mossetto 1994).
While a number of models of rent-seeking have been developed (e.g. Becker
1968, Krueger 1974, Posner 1975, Tullock 1980), we know very little about actual rentseeking behavior, in part because this behavior is difficult to observe (some is even
illegal). What we do know, suggests that the use of political influence over policymakers leads to high levels of inefficiency and social waste. Empirical estimates of social
costs of rent-seeking range from 7% of GNP (Kreuger 1974) to 30-45% of GNP
(Mohammad and Whalley 1984).
This paper contributes to the literature on rent-seeking in a number of ways. First,
we present a framework to organize different types of rent-seeking problems. Second, we
develop a model of one of these problems, seeking a risky rent, and its equilibrium and
comparative statics predictions (section 3). Finally, we present the results of an
experiment designed to test these predictions (sections 4 and 5). The results of the
experiment are consistent with ofthe comparative statics predictions of the model,
however they suggest super-optimal rent-seeking expenditures.
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1.1 The Framework
Rent-seeking activities have been observed and described in a variety of
circumstances. Our taxonomy of such activities distinguishes two features of the nature of
the rent which we believe characterize different rent-seeking activities.
First, the rent can be ali-or-none or shared. For example, when competing for an
aU-or-none rent, like having a public park in one's neighborhood, the winner gets the
whole prize at the end. No sharing is involved or possible. Alternately, there are some
situations where rent-seekers compete for a share from a common pool, such as the
allocation of the public budget among bureaus.
A second feature ofthe rent is whether it is certain or risky. For example, when
competing for a certain rent, like the aforementioned park, the payoff to the winner is
certain and known to be so. In contrast, when competing for a risky rent, the value of the
rent to the winner is not known for sure. A recent paper suggests that all rents which stem
from the government might be uncertain in that funds allocated to a group from a
governmental budget (perhaps the result of some rent-seeking game) may not be
disbursed (Kahana and Nitzan 1998).
Figure 1 shows examples for each possible outcome. The local park is a riskless,
aU-or-none rent; the community's value for the park is presumably known in advance,
and only one community can get it. In contrast, an allocation of a budget is a riskless,
shared rent. The bureaus know their value from receiving the budget, but each gets a
share of the budget rather than the whole thing. The process of a political appropriation is
an example of a risky, all-or-none rent, in which a process of rent-seeking may determine
whether a group receives a budget line, but the actual appropriation process is uncertain.

3

Finally, participating in a primary campaign is a risky, shared rent. If the candidate is
elected, the campaign workers would share in the rents gained, however the election itself
is uncertain.

Insert Figure 1 about here

This paper presents a new theoretical and experimental investigation of rentseeking expenditures for risky, ali-or-none rents (the upper-right cell ofFigure 1). We
derive and compare equilibrium and comparative static predictions with experimental
results.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section provides a review of the previous
research on rent-seeking. Section 3 introduces the experimental model and the hypotheses
on equilibrium predictions and comparative statics. After describing the experimental
design in section 4, results are analyzed in section 5. The paper ends with a discussion
and suggestions for possible extensions.

2. Previous Research

In this section we briefly review two main categories of previous research in this
area; theoretical and experimental.

2.1 Theoretical Resean·h
Tullock ( 1980) proposed a model of rent-seeking which we will later extend to the
case of risky rents. In Tullock's model, n players (who can be viewed as individuals or
interest groups composed by members with homogeneous interests) have well-defined
preferences over the allocation of some social resources. In order to influence the policy-
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maker's decision, each player can invest some amount $x i in unproductive activities. The
probability of obtaining player i's preferred policy is assumed to be the following
function of xi:

where ai reflects the marginal etlect of rent-seeking ex penditure on the probability of
getting one' s preferred outcome. 1 This parameter a i can be seen as a basic notion of
political influence. The higher an individual's or group 's political influence over the
social planner, the higher the agents' capacity to secure desirable outcomes for a given
level of rent-seeking expenditure.
Using this framework, each player solves the following decision problem in a
noncooperative environment :
MaxEU,

xC:i

= ---'-'- - · u(R)+u( w, -

x;)

xi

where R is an indivisible fixed rent; x i is the rent-seeking expenditure and wi is the initial
wealth of player i. After solving for the set of N ash equilibria, Tullock concludes that
there may be over, complete or under-dissipation of the rent by rent-seeking activities,
depending on the number of players involved. 2 Nitzan ( 1994) presents a survey of other
rent-seeking results.
In the present study, we extend Tullock 's model to a risky ali-or-none rent (the

upper right-hand cell ofFigure 1), assuming symmetric political influence (a;=1 'Iii). W e
solve for the Nash equilibrium of the new model, and derive some comparative statics
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results of that equilibriwn. We then go on to ex perimentally test the equilibriwn point
predictions and comparative statics.

2.2 Experimental Research
In contrast to theoretical work, experimental analysis of rent-seeking behavior is a
relatively new approach. The first paper in this area, Millner and Pratt ( 1989), examine
the effectiveness of rent-seeking (i.e. the parameter <X;) on the final outcome in Tullock' s
( 1980) rent-seeking game. Focusing on the two symmetric cases of <:x;= 1 and <:x;=3, their
results indicate that increases in the marginal effectiveness of rent-seeking leads to higher
dissipation ofthe final prize as predicted by the N ash equilibriwn, but the average
dissipation rate is higher than predicted by Nash solution for <:x;= 1 and lower for <:x;=3.
In an attempt to examine the effect of individual preferences on the final outcome,

Millner and Pratt ( 1991) present a different experiment in which they test the theoretical
predictions of Hillman and Katz (1984). They conclude, in contrast to the model' s
predictions, that relatively less risk-averse subjects dissipate more of the final rent.

In other work, Shogren and Baik ( 1991) theoretically analyze the rent-seeking
game with an exit option (allowing players not to participate). They show there is no
Nash equilibriwn when <:x;>2 for all i. In addition, they design an ex periment using an
explicit one-shot payoff matrix, in which results are consistent with the theoretical
prediction when <X;

=

1.

Finally, in two recent papers Davis and Reilly theoretically and experimentally
examine the e±Iect of adding a strategic buyer who engages in rent-defending activities.
In Davis and Reilly ( 1998a) they show that the intro duction of such a buyer reduces social
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costs. 3 In Davis and Reilly ( l988b) , they show that adding multiple buyers ameliorates
the benefits of adding one.
In this paper, we test both the baseline predictions from our extended model and

its comparative statics (the inf1uence of group size and initial endowments) in an
experimental setting. In addition, we examine cultural factors and their inf1uence on rentseeking expenditures, using data from both the U S and Turkey.

3. The Model and Experimental Hypotheses

This section describes our extension of Tullock 's ( 1980) model. Subsections
describe the equilibrium strategies for symmetric and asymmetric games, and derive the
comparative statics of the model. These theoretical res ults provide our hypotheses for the
experiment.
Consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage, players participate in a
rent-seeking contest in order to win a risky ali-or-none rent. In the second stage, the
winner of Stage I competes against nature to determine the probability of receiving the
rent. The ex pected value of the rent is a (positive) function of the winner's endowment
remaining after rent-seeking expenditures have been made.
Returning to the example of political appropriations, this can be interpreted in the
following way: In the first stage, interest groups compete against each other in order to
get funds from the Appropriations Committee. Once the funds are allocated, in the next
stage, there is some chance they will not be disbursed. The probability of disbursement is
related to the budget these interests groups have remaining. The winning group can then
spend their remaining resources to secure their promised allocation.
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Using the lottery framework proposed by Tullock, we model the expected utility
of player i as

f.!. ·u(R)

In

Eui

x.

= )J

~

w . - x.

I

.

~

xi + L.Jxi

I

I

•

u(R)

otherwise

wi

j 7i
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where x; is player i' s rent-seeking expenditure in the first stage,

l:xi

is the aggregate

j 7i

rent-seeking expenditure of the opponents; w; is player i's initial endowment; w;-x; is the
amount left for the second stage and $R is the prize in monetary terms. 4
This formalization has a number of interesting properties. First, the probability of
winning the contest is as in Tullock 's model with a;= 1. However, the rent earned is no
longer certain but instead probabilistic. The probability of earning the rent is exactly the
percentage of the individual's endowment remaining. Thus rent-seeking expenditures
must be balanced against a reduced expected value ofthe prize if one wins the contest.
A second nice property of this model of risky rent for purposes of experimentation
is that it implements a binary lottery procedure, and thus, in theory, we need not concern
ourselves about risk preferences of our subjects. Further discussion of the binary lottery
procedure is presented below and in Roth and Malouf ( 1979).
In our model, each individual thus faces the following problem:

Max EU,(x,x_, )

x 1e (O, w1 ]

x.

1

x,+ I.xj

[(w.w,-x.}
1

1

l

1(R) , fori= l, ... , n

fl· i

where R>O is a pre-determined and publicly known rent, expressed in monetary terms.
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For a fixed

2:Xj ,the first-order condition yields:
I~i

The corresponding best-response function can be derived from this set oftirst-order
conditions:
w. L.x *
l

j~i

1

+(r.x*)~ -L.x. ,jhr i=l, ... ,n
j -!-i

J

j -f"i

J

In this extended model, the optimal rent-seeking contribution is independent of

the final prize R. Therefore we cannot draw any general conclusions about how much
rent-dissipation takes place.5

3.1 The Symmetric Game
For a symmetric game in which all players have equal endowments (w; =w '\ti),
the equilibrium strategies can be straightforwardly derived from simultaneously solving
the set of best-response functions, which yields the equilibrium level ofrent-seeking
expenditure:
"'

Xs

1)
.
= w(n,
fhr z = l , ... ,n
2n-l ·

It should be noted that while (xi,x-J=(O,O) is not an equilibrium outcome, it is Pareto-

efficient.
In the symmetric endowment treatments of our experiment, then , we expect

subjects to choose the equilibrium amount of rent-seeking expenditures.

Hypothesis IS: When players' endowments are symmetric, we expect subjects to
choose xs * of rent-seeking expenditure.
9

3.2 The A!lymmetric Game
For asymmetric games where w;:;t:wj, the same set of best response functions can be
simultaneously solved, yielding an equilibrium prediction of:

The equilibrium strategy x ;A"' is again Pareto-inferior to x;=O Vi. Note that the symmetric
game solution above is simply a special case ofthe asymmetric game with w;=w Vi.
In the asymmetric endowment treatments of our experiment, then, we expect
subjects to choose the equilibrium amount of rent-seeking expenditures.

Hypothesis lA: When players' endowments are asymmetric, we expect sub_jects to
choose XiA * of rent-seeking expenditure.

3.3 Comparative Statics

f~lthe

Model

3. 3.1 Own Endowment
Our second and third hypotheses involve the comparative statics effect of
variations in the initial wealth allocation. The impact of increasing one player's wealth
leaving others' endowment constant (either changing the symmetric wealth structure to an
asymmetric one or increasing o wn wealth in an already asymmetric game) is intuitive, an
increase in own endowment level holding all else constant increases the optimal rentseeking expenditure. Appendix A provides the derivation of all comparative statics
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predictions.

ax·

____!i_

dl.v;

> 0 for n
.

~1

This result leads us to Hypothesis 2:

Hypothesis 2: Subjects' rent-seeking expenditures will increase with an increase in
their own endowment, keeping their opponents' endowment levels constant.

3. 3.2 Opponents ' Endowment

A similar increase in the opponents' endowment levels holding all else constant
also increases optimal rent-seeking expenditures, but not by as much as an increase in
one 's own endowment level:

This result leads us to hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3: Subjects' rent-seeking expenditures will increase with an increase in
their opponents' endowment, but not as much as with an increase in their own.
3. 3.3 N umber ofPlayers
The final comparative statics hypothesis involves the number of players.
Equilibrium rent-seeking behavior is positively related to the number of players
competing for the prize. Taking the derivative of the optimal expenditure, x/ and X iA *,
with respect to the number of players, n, we can show that expenditure increases with
group size in both symmetric and asymmetric games, holding all else constant.
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()x*.8

-
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" > 0 for n ~ l
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-
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These results lead us to hypothesis 4:

Hypothesis 4: Subjects' rent-seeking expenditure will increase with an increase in
the number of players.

Our experimental design (as outlined in the next section) allows us to test
hypotheses lS, lA, 2 and 3 directly. However, in the experiment we simultaneously
increase both the number of players and their endowments. Since both have a positive
effect on an individual's rent-seeking expenditures, we ex pect hypothesis 4 to hold in our
experimental setting as well. The next section describes our experimental design in more
detail.

4. Experimental Design and Procedures

4.1. Experimental Design
The experiment designed to test these hypotheses consisted oftwo sessions (one
in the US and one in Turkey). There were four treatments in each session, varying in
group size and initial endowment levels. Table l shows the parameters for each
treatment, together with the equilibrium predictions for optimal rent-seeking
expenditures.

Insert Table 1 about here
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This experimental design allows us to test our hypotheses detailed above. First,
we compare rent-seeking expenditures against the Nash equilibrium predictions in both
symmetric and asymmetric groups.
To test the comparative statics hypothesis about own wealth, we compare
expenditures by subjects in two-person symmetric groups whose endowments are 30 with
those in two-person asymmetric groups whose endowments are 60 (this comparison keeps
constant the number of players and the endowments of others). The prediction is that
rent-seeking expenditures should increase by 7 units (moving from 10 to 17).
To test the comparative statics hypothesis about others' wealth, we compare
expenditures by subjects whose endowments are 30 in symmetric groups with those in
asymmetric groups (this comparison keeps constant the number of players and own
endowment, changing only the endowment of others in the group). The increase in the
equilibrium rent-seeking expenditures with an increase in opponents' endowment is
positive but incremental with these parameters (moving from 10 to 11 in the two-person
case and 13 to 14 in the four-person case).
To test the comparative statics hypothesis about the number of s ubjects, we
compare expenditures by subjects in two-person groups with those in four-person groups.
This comparison can be done in a way which keeps the subjects' own endowment
constant (e.g. a 30-endowment subject in a two-person symmetric group versus a 30endowment s ubject in a four-person symmetric group), but allows the total wealth of the
others in the group to increase as well. Since our analysis of these two effects suggest
both are both positive, we expect to see a significant increase in this comparison. We can
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compare the size of this effect and the previous one to determine the extent to which the
increase in expenditures is caused by the increase in the number of rent-seekers in the
group versus the increase in the endowments of others.

4.2. Experimental Procedures
Two sessions were run, one in the US (n= 174) and the other in Turkey (n= 127).
The US subject pool was drawn from the University of Pennsylvania undergraduate
students enrolled in an introductory course in public economics. The subject pool in
Turkey was recruited from undergraduate students majoring in business administration at
Bogazici University. Subjects were paid a show-up fee of$3 (300,000 TL in Turkey) as
well as their earnings in the experiment. 6 All subjects received their earnings privately
after the experiment had ended.
The experiments in Turkey were run in Turkish by the same experimenter who ran
the US sessions. All instructions were translated and back-translated. A copy of the
instructions in English is reproduced as Appendix B; a Turkish copy as well as the raw
data from the experiment is available from the authors upon request.
The experiment used a between-subject design, thus no subject participated in
more than one session. All treatments were conducted in a classroom. Subjects were
seated so that that they could not communicate with one another and groups assigned
randomly and anonymously.
The experimenter distributed the instructions and read them aloud to create
common information (if not common knowledge). Subjects were given 10 minutes to
make their decisions. A post-ex perimental quiz was given to check if the subjects
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understood the instructions and the rules of the game. Six participants ±rom US and 11
±rom Turkey were excluded based on their performance , leaving 80 subjects in both of the
symmetric treatments; 66 in the 2-person asymmetric treatment and 68 in the 4-person
asymmetric treatment.
The game was implemented as follows. Each player received some predetermined
number of cards. In the first stage, each player chose how many of the cards to spend by
sending the appropriate number of cards to the experimenter. The experimenter then
mixed all the cards for each group together and chose one. This determined the winner of
the rent-seeking game in each group.
The winner then participated in a lottery in the second stage. For this lottery, the
remaining cards of the winning player were mixed with blank ones to sum to the
prespecitied total of their endowment, wi. A random draw was then made. Ifthe card
drawn was one of the player' s, they won $R =$20 (or 2,000,000 TL). The game ended
after this drawing. Participants were paid privately and left the room. 7
This experimental model implements a binary lottery procedure, which in theory
induces risk-neutral behavior (Roth and Malou±: 1979). By normalizing u($20)=1 and
u($0)=0, the expected utility ofthe game becomes

If subjects are expected-utility maximizers, we expect them to act as risk-neutral players
in this game.

5. Results and Discussion
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5.1 Overview
Figure 2 shows the distribution of rent-seeking expenditures for the symmetric
(w;=30) and asymmetric groups (w;=30 and wj=60). The optimum bids are also included
to compare the results with the theoretical predictions. 11

Insert Figure 2 about here

The results suggest than most of the s ubjects spent more than the predicted level
of rent-seeking expenditures. In symmetric groups of 2 and 4 , the average rent-seeking
expenditures were 15.41 and 17.39, exceeding the equilibrium predictions of 10 and 13.
The results trom the asymmetric groups are similar. On average, there is excessive
expenditure relative to the equilibrium prediction, for both low and high-endowment
types. The next subsection presents some statistical tests ofthese observations.

5.2 Hypothesis lS, lA: Equilibrium Predictions
The first question posed by our study is the extent to which the point predictions
of the rent-seeking game's equilibrium are supported by the experimental data. Table 2
presents the average rent-seeking ex penditure in each treatment, and the results of a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test in order to test whether the actual expenditures are
significantly different trom the ones predicted by the theory. 9

Insert Table 2 about here

In the symmetric game, levels of rent-seeking expenditures are significantly
higher than the Nash equilibrium predictions, for subjects in the US and Turkey, and for
groups of size 2 and of size 4 (p<.O 1 for all). In the asymmetric game, average rent-

16

seeking expenditures are significantly higher than the equilibrium prediction for both
low- and high-endowment types in the 2-person treatments in both the US and Turkey
(p<.Ol for all), and for the low-endowment types in the 4-person treatments (p<.05 in U S,
p<.Ol in Turkey). However, the mean expenditure for the high-endowment subjects in the
4-person treatment is not statistically different than the predicted value in either country.
Although the overall average rent-seeking ex penditures are slightly higher for the subject
group in Turkey, none of the di±Ierences are statistically significant. 10
Two further analyses of subjects' play are of interest. First, though subjects may
not be playing a Nash equilibrium, they may be playing a best-response to other s ubjects'
actions. For each s ubject, we calculated their best-response to the actual actions of others
in their group. We then calculated the difference between their actual expenditure and
their best-response. Table 3 presents the average (and standard deviation) of differences
in each treatment, pooled over the US and Turkey. A similar nonparametric test confirms
that these differences are significantly positive.

Insert Table 3 about here

In all treatments, the mean rent-seeking expenditure is significantly higher than the bestresponse predictions, indicating that subjects are over-investing in rent-seeking activities,
not only above the Nash equilibrium level but even above the level of best-response to
their counterpart's actions.
A second analysis involves the cost of this overexpenditure to the subjects. Table
4 presents a comparison between the expected payoff in the Nash eq uilibrium, and the
average expected payoffs for each s ubject in each treatment (using the exchange rate
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described above). The final column presents the socially optimal payoff's, where each
individual spends nothing on rent-seeking.

Insert Table 4 about here

Actual earnings are systematically less than those at the Nash prediction. The
deviation from Nash strategies led to a decrease in expected payoff's between 13% and
48% .

5.3 Hypothesis 2: Comparative Statics, Own Initial Endowments
Comparative statics of our model predict that rent-seeking expenditures will
increase when own initial wealth level increases. Table 5 displays the average increases
in expenditures as own initial endowments increase.

Insert Table 5 about here

A direct test of this hypothesis compares the rent-seeking ex penditures by subjects
in two-person groups whose endowments were 30 with those whose endowments were
60, holding their counterpart' s endowments constant at 30. These results indicate that an
increase in one's own initial wealth level (wi) leads to a significantly higher rent-seeking
expenditure in both Turkey and the US (p<.O1 for both).
The hypothesis also supported by data from the four-person groups, although the
test is less direct. Table 5 compares rent-seeking expenditures by subjects in four-person
groups whose endowments were 30 with those whose endowments were 60. In addition
to the subjectsi own endowments increasing, subjects in the latter group faced
competitors with increased endowments as well. Both these comparative statics
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hypotheses point in the same direction (increased rent-seeking) which is indeed observed
in both the US and in Turkey (p<.05 for both).

5.4 Hypothesis 3: Comparative Statics, Others' Initial Endowments
Our second hypothesis involved the comparative static prediction of an increase in
rent-seeking expenditures as the wealth of others in the group increases, holding own
wealth constant. In Table 6 we compare the rent-seeking expenditures by subjects in twoperson groups whose endowments were 30 and whose competitors' endowments were
either 60 or 30. In addition, we compare rent-seeking expenditures by subjects in fourperson groups whose endowments were 30 and whose competitors' endowments were
either 150 (30, 60, 60) or 90 (30, 30, 30).

Insert Table 6 about here

The predicted effect of others' wealth was incremental (an increase of one unit)
and was not observed in our experiment, possibly due to its small size. As Table 6
shows, an increase in the opponents' wealth level did not have a statistically significant
impact on subjects' rent-seeking expenditures in either two or four person groups.
5. 5 Hypothesis 4: Comparative Stath's, Group Size

Comparative statics of our model predict that rent-seeking expenditures will
increase with an increase in the number of rent-seekers. In our experiment, we can
compare rent-seeking expenditures of subjects with the same endowment in groups of
size two and four. However, this change also involves increasing the endowment of
others. The model predicts each effect individually should lead to an increase in rent-
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seeking expenditures, which is exactly what we see.
To test for this increase statistically, a Wilcoxon nonparametric test was
conducted to examine the difference between the mean ex penditures for 2-person and 4person groups. The results reveal that in all cases, the difference is statistically significant
(p<.05). These results are reported in Table 7.

Insert Table 7 about here

The question about which change is causing the increase in expenditures, the
increase in group size or the increase in others' endowment, can be answered by
comparing the size of this efiect to that in the previous subsection, where only others'
endowment was changed. We saw no significant effect of others' endowment on
subjects' expenditures, but we do see a significant effect when we change both group size
and others ' endowment. We conclude, then, that the change in group size itself has a
significant effect on individual rent-seeking expenditures.
5. 6 Summary ofResults and Discussion

Results from this experiment were surprisingly consistent with the comparative
statics predictions of the risky-rent seeking model we developed above. Rent seeking
expenditures increased significantly as the player's own wealth level increased, as
predicted by the model, in all the treatments. In addition, rent-seeking expenditures
increased as the number of players (and their endowments) increased, although a simple
increase in the endowment of others did not affect expenditures.
However, the model's Nash equilibrium point prediction of rent-seeking
expenditures was not observed. Instead, most subjects in both countries spent
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significantly more toward rent-seeking activities, leading to more rent dissipation than
predicted by the model. 11 We find that subjects' deviations from equilibrium result in
lower payoffs than could have been achieved had they played the equilibrium (ranging
from expected losses of 13% to 48% ). Finally, we cannot explain the data by ass uming
that individuals play a best-response to their counterparts' play; their expenditures are
still higher than the best-response predicts.
Instead, we conjecture that in this two-stage game, individuals engaged in a
myopic competition, focused mostly in winning the initial stage of political contest
without taking into account the costs of winning in terms of expected value ofthe prize
later on. Some arguments given in the post-experiment questionnaire reveal this rationale
for overexpenditure in the lobbying stage. One subject wrote:

Like a potential monopolist, I want to make it through the first stage. I'm
willing to spend more now so that I can clear out my competition for later.
Another told us
I can control the percentage of winning in Stage II (given the total size of
30 chips). However, I don't know what my opponents will submit in the
first stage.
If rent-seekers in the real world are indeed myopic, we expect to see much rentseeking in the first stage of appropriation games, but not enough left in the second stage,
to g uarantee the disbursement of funds. Thus we expect many funds to be allocated but
not disbursed. For instance, in 1996 fiscal year, the US Congress authorized $6 billion
for the privatization programs of the Department of Energy (DOE) but failed to
appropriate most of these funds. Following this failure, DOE called only for $500 million
in the 1999 fiscal year. This sharp decline in DOE's request may be a result of a shift in
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their policy: Instead of engaging in a myopic rent-seeking game against other
departments, DOE might have decided to spend their resources for the actual
disbursement of their share.

6. Conclusion
Theoretical models (e.g. Tullock, 1980) as well as empirical work (e.g. Kreuger
1974, Mohammad and Whalley 1984, Mossetto 1994, Wise and Sandler 1994) have
demonstrated the inefficient use of resources caused by rent-seeking expenditures. This
paper models rent-seeking expenditures for a risky rent and analyzes an experimental
rent-seeking game of the same type.
In our study, rent-seeking expenditures were found to be significantly higher than

the theoretical predictions, creating more inefficiency than predicted. We conjecture that
this result may have been caused by myopia on the part of the subjects. This conjecture is
supported by anecdotal evidence.
Additional analysis focused on testing the comparative statics properties of this
rent-seeking model. These were generally supported by the experimental results.
Expenditures were significantly and positively related to group size and one 's own wealth
level.
The experiment used subjects from two different countries: US and Turkey.
Average expenditures were found to be somewhat higher in Turkey, although this
difference was not statistically significant. Further empirical studies on cross-cultural
ditlerences may provide further insight to the question whether cultural differences play a
role in determining the level of lobbying expenditures.
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Several additional questions (and follow-up studies) are suggested by our
findings. One fundamental question is how to reduce the inefficiency associated with the
observed, super-optimal, rent-seeking. For example, are there institutional arrangements
which can reduce this inefficiency? Perhaps allowing for communication and/or collusion
between the parties may lead rent-seekers toward a more efficient allocation of resources.
Although in other settings like markets, collusion is often seen as reducing efficiency, in
this setting it could help by allowing players to collude on low rent-seeking expenditures.
Another institutional arrangement open for investigation is moving from a oneshot to a finitely repeated game. This may represent a more realistic situation where
lobbying groups interact repeatedly in the legislative arena. This move would open the
door for two changes. First, collusion on low rent-seeking ex penditures might be easier
to develop and s ustain in this repeated setting. Second, subjects could learn about the
(in)effectiveness of rent-seeking and may even become less myopic.
A final institutional parameter which could affect the extent of observed
inefficiency is the value of the risky rent, $R. Although the Nash equilibrium investment
in lobbying does not depend on this rent parameter, in practice the size of the stake will
likely affect the behavior of the participants.
Rent-seeking, in the form of lobbying, political action committees or bribery, has
important economic and social implications, for both efficiency and equity reasons. By
studying individual behavior in the laboratory, under minimal institutional contexts, we
can pinpoint the similarities and differences between behavior and game theoretic
predictions, and can better make predictions about the actual behavior of interest groups
in diflerent institutional settings.
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Table 1: Experimental Treatments and Equilibria

#of
Players

Initial
Endowments

n=2

(30, 30)

Predicted
Expenditure
on Rent-Seeking
(10, 10)

n=2

(30, 60)

(11, 17)

n=4

(30, 30, 30, 30)

(13, 13, 13, 13)

n=4

(30, 30, 60, 60)

(14, 14, 23, 23)

28

Table 2: Average Rent-Seeking Expenditures (standard deviations)

US

TURKEY

n=2,x*=10

14.94 **
(4.93)

15.87**
(5.86)

n=4, x*= l3

16.09**
(5.67)

18.69**
(6.75)

n=2, w=30, x *=11

15.02 **
(4.97)

15.96**
(4.55)

n=2, w=60, x *= 17

2 1.26**
(6.69)

21.79**
(5.89)

n=4, w=30, x*=14

17.72*
(6.18)

19.56**
(5.40)

n=4, w=60, x *=23

2 1.78
(5.57)

23.81
(5.42)

s;ymmetnc

A symmet•
nc

* p <.05
** p <.01
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Table 3: Average Differences: Actual Expenditures- Best-Response Expenditures

Asymmetric
Symmetric

w;=30

w;=60

n=2

5.06**
(2.15)

4.81**
( 1.38)

5.62**
( 1.81)

n=4

5.97**
(2.66)

5.26**
( 1.99)

5.88**
(2.07)

* p <.05
** p <.01
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Table 4: Expected Payoffs

Expected Payofi
under Nash

Expected Payoff
Observed (US)

Expected Payoff
Observed (Turkey)

Social Optimum
Payoff

30,30

$6.67

$4.58

$4.49

$10

30,60

$3.51

$2.25

$ 1.8 1

$10

30,60

$4.98

$4.02

$3.72

$10

30,30,30,30

$8.70

$6.88

$6.78

$5

30,30,60,60

$2.02

$1.76

$ 1.53

$5

30,30,60,60

$3.83

$3.1 7

$3.15

$5

Initial
Endowm ent
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Table 5: Effect of Own Initial Wealth on Rent-Seeking Expenditures

US

TURKEY

n=2
(w; = 60) - (w;

=

30)

6.32**

5.92**

=

30)

5.69*

5.12**

n=4
(w; = 60) - (w;

* p <.05
** p <.01
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Table 6: Effect of Opponents' Initial Wealth on Rent-Seeking Expenditures

US

TURKEY

n=2
(wj

=

60) - (wj

=

30)

.08

.09

60) - (wj

=

30)

1.63*

.87

n=4
(wj

=

* p <.05
** p <.01
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Table 7: Effect of Group Size on Rent-Seeking Expenditures

US

TURKEY

1.15**

2.82**

.94*
4.13**

.96*
4.40**

Symmetric
(n=2)- (n=4)

Asymmetric
(n=2)- (n=4)
low-endowment
high-endowment

* p <.05
** p <.01
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Figure 1: A Taxonomy of Rent-Seeking

R"lS kless 0 utcome

R"tskcy 0 utcome

AU-or-None Rent

siting a local park

political appropriation

Shared Rent

allocation of budget
among divisions

working on a primary
campatgn
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Figure 2: Distributions of Rent-Seeking Expenditures
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Appendix A: Derivation of Comparative Statics12

A.l. Own Endowment
Taking the derivative of x ";A with respect to wi yields

Since n, w;,

L w1 ~ 0, this expression is non-negative for all i and therefore as one's
}7oi

endowment increases, the equilibrium rent-seeking will also increase.

A.2. Opponents' Endowment

Lw

Taking the derivative of x ";A with respect to

1

yields

j#

a~~~}
;,.;

142.857nw; +57.1429L w1
=

.22+ [

}#

3

2

1

128n wi +240n w}

~w1 + 123nw;[ L.. . 1v

1)

J -:#-l

57.1429[4n 2 1v~ +5nw;~ w

1

f #-l

+[~ w

+

16[~ w

f"#- 1

2
2

1)

2

]·

2

40n w;

J :#-1

+41mv;~ w +8[~w1
1

J *-'

.J::F-l

Jll!J
1 )

j':#-1

By simplifying and rounding to the nearest whole number we get
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)"

Since this expression is positive for n, w 1 ,

L wj ~ 0 , we can conclude that
j#

ax:~2: wj ~ 0 for '\li.
/ a ~,,

Hence, an increase in opponents' endowment leads to an increase

in one's rent-seeking expenditures.

A.3. Number f~lPlayers

A.3.1 Symmetric Case

The equilibrium rent-seeking ex penditure in the symmetric case is
•
Xr

·'

=

w( n-1)

2n -1

, fh r

·

.
l

= l , ... , n

Taking the derivative with respect to n gives

ax·

----l =

dn

w
(2n -1t

,

> 0 for all w > 0
·

Therefore, the equilibrium rent-seeking expenditure increases with an increase in the
number of players.
A.3.2 A symmetric Case
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Taking the derivative of x "'iA with respect to n yields

ox~,

-

'·'

on
[

2
l28n-\t1 + 240n\t~ ~
I *-t

ltj

+

l23mt~(~ It';)" + 16(~
J '#-t

1 4
ltj ) ]

/.l

f F-t

for 'iii , which indicates that the equilibrium rent-

seeking expenditure increases with an increase in the number of players.
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Appendix B: Experimental Instructions (English)
n=4, symmetric, wi = 30

You are about to participate in an experiment about individual decision-making. If you follow
the instructions carefully and make a good decision, you will have the opportunity to win $20.
Instructions

You are randomly grouped with three of your classmates. You will not be told who the other
members of your group are. All the decisions will be made privately. Please do not speak to
anyone during the experiment.
Each of the group member is given an empty yellow envelope and a white envelope with 30
index cards inside. The index cards are identified with a group number and a letter assigned
to you as an identification within your group. For instance, 7B means you are player Bin
group 7.
Please take your index cards out of the envelope and look at your ID number and your own
individual letter. Record these on this sheet now. This information is for your private use
only.
Group number
Individual letter
When you finish, please turn over to the next page.
We now explain the ex perimental procedure. In the first stage, you will put some of your
cards into the yellow envelope that is provided and return the yellow envelope to the
instructor. Note that you cannot observe your opponents' contribution. You are going to keep
the rest of your index cards in the original white envelope.
The instructor will then mix both your and your opponents' contributions and pick
one card. If it is one of yours, you will have the opportunity to participate in the lottery. If it is
not, you will gain nothing and one of the other group members will play the lottery. Your
probability of being a finalist depends on the ratio of cards you submit to the total number of
cards s ubmitted. In other words, if yo u submit X cards and your opponents submit a total of
Y , the probability of you winning this bidding is ~-If there is a tie (i.e. both you and
X+Y

some other group member submits the same amount of cards), you will have an even chance
of being chosen.
In the next stage, the finalist will participate in a lottery to win $20. The procedure of the
lottery is as follow s: The finalist will give his/her white envelope with the remaining cards to
the instructor. The instructor will then add blank cards to the finalist's cards in order to add
up to a total of 30 index cards. Then one draw will be made. If the card is one of the finalist's,
he/she will get $20. If not, he/she will get nothing. Therefore, the probability of winning the
lottery is determined by the ratio of the number of the remaining index cards ofthe finalist to
30.
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For instance, suppose you submit 10 cards in the first stage and your opponents s ubmit 5, 10
10
and 15. Your probability of being a finalist in this case is
2.2 =..:!.
5+ 10+ 10+ 15

40

4

If you become the finalist, your 20 remaining cards will be mixed with 10 blank cards and a
random draw will be made. Your probability of winning the $20 lottery prize, in this second
stage, is _lQ_ = 20 =1
20+ 10

30

3

The following table reflects your probability of winning the $20 lottery prize, if you are
given the opportunity to participate in the lottery.
no of cards left

prob ofwinning !no of cards left

prob of winning

0

0

16

0.53

1

0.03

17

0.56

2

0.06

18

0.60

3

0.10

19

0.63

4

0.13

20

0.66

5

0.16

21

0.70

6

0.20

22

0.73

7

0.23

23

0.76

8

0.26

24

0.80

9

0.30

25

0.83

10

0.33

26

0.86

11

0.36

27

0.90

12

0.40

28

0.93

13

0.43

29

0.96

14

0.46

30

1.00

15

0.50

Please raise your hand if you have any questions about the procedure.
Now decide how many of your index cards yo u are willing to submit in the first stage. Put
that number of cards into the yellow envelope. Close the envelope and raise your hand.
The monitor will come to collect the envelope. Keep the rest of your index cards inside
the original white envelope.
The first stage of the experiment is now over. Once all yellow envelopes are collected, the
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experimenters will note the finalist from each group. Please do not go on to the next page
until the monitor picks up your yellow envelope.
After all the envelopes are collected, the instructor will mix the contributions in each
group and pick one card. The group number and letter of the finalists will be written on
the blackboard. Once all the drawings are made, the finalists will go outside the
classroom one by one to participate in the lottery.
For all the participants except the finalists, the experiment is now over. Thank you for
your participation. Please wait at your desk until the monitor collects this sheet and your
original white envelope with the remaining cards.
For the finalists, please step forward with your original white envelope with the
rem aining cards and this instruction sheet in order to participate in the lottery.
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Endnotes
1

A related line of research models an indivisible rent-seeking game as an all-pay auction
(e.g. Anderson eta/. 1998, Baye eta/. 1993, Baye et a/. 1996, Bliss and Na1ebuff 1984,
Holt and Sherman 1982). In an all-pay auction, all bidders pay their respective bids up
front (as though they all invested in rent-seeking activities) and the prize (the final rent) is
given to the highest bidder (the player with the highest rent-seeking expenditure).
Tullock's ( 1980) and other rent-seeking models difier from all-pay auctions in that the
highest bidder is not guaranteed the prize, but instead receives it with some probability.
2

This result helped to organize much of the previous theoretical literature in which
authors argued over whether the rent is over-dissipated by rent-seeking expenditure (e.g.
Tullock, 1967), exactly dissipated (e.g. Becker 1968, Krueger 1974, Posner 1975) or
under-dissipated (Hillman and Samet, 1987). Other theoretical studies have attempted to
identify different determinants of rent dissipation like entry (Corcoran and Karels 1985,
Higgins, eta/. 1985), number and homogeneity of competitors (Gradstein 1994, Hillman
and Riley 1989, Nitzan 1991), number ofwinners (Berry, 1993), risk preferences of
players (Hillman and Katz, 1984), competition (Ellingsen 1991, Schmidt 1992). Recent
theoretical work has focused on the endogenous formation of rents (Appelbaum and Katz
1986, Gradstein 1993, Chung 1996, Ursprung 1990, Riaz, Shogren and Johnson 1995).
3

Interestingly, this paper also shows more rent dissipation occurs in all-pay auctions
(where the highest player earns the rent for sure) than in rent-seeking games (where
player' s probabilities of winning the rent are a function of their rent-seeking activities).
4

Unlike Tullock's model, here any wealth remaining after rent-seeking is not consumed
directly but instead used to increase the probability of receiving the rent. Our
experimental implementation will be consistent with this feature of the model. Adding an
additional use of endowment (direct consumption) changes the equilibrium level of rentseeking expenditures, but does not affect the comparative statics implications of the
model.
5

For instance, for a 2-person symmetric game with w;=wj=15, the total rent-seeking
expenditure will be $10. The rent will be overdissipated if it is below $ 10, exactly
dissipated if it is $10 and underdissipated if it is more than $10.
6

The exchange rate was approximately $1 = 100,000 TL at the time ofthe experiment.

7

For instance, in the treatment with n=2 and w 1=w 2=30, suppose Player 1 submits 5 cards
in the first stage and her opponent s ubmits 10. The probability of Player 1 winning the
first stage is 5/( 10+5)=.33. After the drawing, if she becomes the finalist, her remaining
25 cards are mixed with 5 blank cards and a second draw is made in Stage II. The
probability of her winning this stage is 25/(25+5)=.83.
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xAlthough in asymmetric groups some subjects could allocate up to 60 tokens toward
rent-seeking activities, in practice no subject allocated more than 30. We thus keep the
scale of the x-axis the same in these graphs to facilitate comparisons.
9

Since the Shapiro-Wilk test shows that the 2-person asymmetric treatment in Turkey and
the 4-person asymmetric treatment in the US are not normally distributed (p<.05),
nonparametric tests are used for all subsequent analysis.
10

These comparisons are on the basis of absolute deviations from the Nash equilibrium.
As one seminar participant suggested, we can also look at percentage deviations from the
Nash equilibrium. For each s ubject we can calculate the difference between their
expenditure and the equilibrium expenditure, then divide that difference by the
equilibrium expenditure to calculate the percentage differences. For the symmetric games,
the average percentage deviation from equilibrium is 53% (n=2) and 41% (n=4 ). For
asymmetric games, low income players the deviation is 48% (n=2) and 44% (n=4) and for
high income players the deviation is 42% (n=2) and 37% (n=4).
''One seminar participant suggested that subjects' risk aversion may be causing the overexpenditure. The procedure in this experiment, equivalent to a binary lottery procedure,
should in theory induce risk-neutrality. However, even if it did not, it seems unlikely that
risk aversion could cause overexpenditure in the first stage since both stages are risky.
Overexpenditure in Stage 1 leads to a higher-risk lottery in Stage 2.
12

The derivations in Appendix A are obtained by Mathematica 3.0.
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